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 Global warming and GHG emissions are the problems 
of  the century
 The innovative character of  emission permits market 
(EPM) as a policy instrument to fight a global negative 
externality 
 EU ETS is one of  the biggest environmental policy 
experiments ever  
The motivation…
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 Grandfathering was the chosen rule for emission 
permits initial allocation on the 1st and 2nd phases of  
the EU ETS.
 However, AUCTIONING is the allocation method 
recommended for the next phases (COM(2008) 16 
final, 23.1.2008)
The motivation…
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“Auctioning best ensures efficiency of  the ETS, 
transparency and simplicity of  the system and 
avoids undesirable distributional effects. 
Auctioning also best complies with the polluter-
pays principle and rewards early action to reduce 
emissions. For these reasons auctioning should be 
the basic principle for allocation.”
(COM(2008) 16 final, 23.1.2008, p.7)
The motivation…
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To experimentally test the performance of  an 
institution that parallels EU ETS but including 
auction as a rule for the initial allocation of  
(100%) CO2 emission permits.
Objective
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 Introduction 
 Experimental Design
 Benchmarks 
 Results
 Conclusion
Outline
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 Several experimental studies exist on EPM: 
Godby et al. (1997), Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse
(1999a), Franciosi et al. (1999), Cason et al. (1999), 
Mestelman et al. (1999) and Gangadharan et al.
(2005) are just a few.
Introduction
 Laboratory experiments on American and
Canadian markets for SO2 were used to test the
rules chosen. 
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 Benz and Ehrhart (2007) experimental study on
EU ETS, for instance, is far from being an EU 
ETS testbeding.
Introduction
 The main contribution of our work is to include
both the rules and the parameters that parallels the
EU ETS structure (and test a specific auction
type).
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An auction type had to be chosen…
 Unique price auctions for multiple units  are 
inefficient as result on demand reduction (ex: 
Holt (2006); Ausubel e Cramton (1998)).
 Vickrey (1961) static auction and Ausubel
(2004) dynamic equivalent version are efficient 
auctions for multiple units.
Introduction
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 Kagel and Levin (2001), Engelmann and
Grimm (2004) and Manelli et al. (2006), for 
example, experimentally test the Ausubel
auction.
 However, their laboratorial environment is far 
from resembling EU ETS or any EPM.
Introduction
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 Holt et al. (2007) experimental study 
represent several characteristics of  EPM and 
test the performance of  5 different auction 
institutions for CO2 allocation (unique and 
discriminative static auctions; English auction; 
Dutch auction and anglo-dutch auction).
But DO NOT test the performance of   the 
Ausubel auction.
Introduction
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Experimental Design
Each computerized (zTree) experimental session 
constituted by 3 parts:
1. Socioeconomic questionnaire
2. Multiple Price List (Holt and Laury, 2002) - elicitation 
of  risk aversion attitudes 
3. EMISSION PERMITS MARKET
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Experimental Design
(EMISSION PERMITS MARKET)
Laboratory rules respected the European 
Commission choices for the EU ETS implicit at the 
2003/87/EC Directive: 
 cap-and-trade system
 banking
 double auction with discriminative prices (reflecting 
rules of  exchanges)
 penalty structure for incompliance 
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Experimental Design
(EMISSION PERMITS MARKET)
Instead of  the 2003/87/EC Directive initial allocation 
rule for CO2 emission permits (grandfathering) we 
followed the COM(2008)16final  recommendation:
 to use auctioning as “the basic principle for 
allocation.”
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Experimental Design
Also included uncertainty on effective emissions 
abatement level. 
Random variation on emissions drawn from a uniform 
distribution (-1, 0, +1) – as Godby et al. (1997).
To assure comparability of  results we used the same 
uniform distribution for the different experimental 
sessions.
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Experimental Design
PARAMETERS chosen for the market intended to 
parallel EU ETS. 
 Marginal abatement costs structure based on Eyckmans
et al. (2000) 
 Participants’ dimension proportional to Belgium (S1), 
Spain (S2), Germany (S3), Greece (S4), France (S5), Italy 
(S6), United Kingdom (S7) and Netherlands (S8).
 Emissions targets fixed according to EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement (BSA).
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Experimental Design
PARAMETERS:
 Emission permits supply fixed (at the auction) for 
each of the 10 periods of the session (88 units)   
 Penalty for noncompliance: -560 points and one 
permit less on the period following the infraction. 
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Experimental Design
Imperfect competition characterised our
laboratorial market: participants with heterogeneous
dimensions, marginal abatement costs and emission
targets (under imperfect information about effective
emission levels – uncertainty context on the demand
side).
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Experimental Design
Neutral language on Instructions :
emission permits, environmental goals or policy 
instruments for regulation were never mentioned: an
homogeneous good produced at different scales and 
costs that could be traded in a certain market…
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Experimental Design
Stages of  the third part of  our experiments 
(repeated in the 10 periods of  our 4 sessions )
____________________________________________
Stage 1: Auction participation
Stage 2: Banking decision
Stage 3: Permit market participation 
Stage 4: Information about random shock 
Stage 5: Reconciliation market participation
Stage 6: Re-banking. 
_____________________________________________
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Stage 1: Auction 
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Stage 1: Auction 
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Stage 2: Banking 
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Stage 3: Permits Market 
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Stage 4: Information about random shock
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Stage 5: Reconciliation market
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Stage 6: Rebanking
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Benchmarks
Supply and demand conditions are NOT the 
same on the 10 periods of  the sessions, although 
marginal abatement costs and participants’ 
dimensions are fixed, as well as the supply in each 
period (88).
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Benchmarks
Random fluctuations on emissions, the 
penalty imposed and the possibility of  
banking change supply and demand 
conditions on the 10 periods.
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Benchmarks
Ex-ante determination of  equilibrium price 
and quantity benchmarks’ considered the 
uncertainty matrix resultant from the 
uniform distribution used for all sessions. 
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Benchmarks
Following Godby et al. (1997) we determined all 
benchmarks considering two cases:
1) Use of  all permits bought in the auction for the 
period - System Optimum Benchmarks;
2) Retention (banking) of  one permit in each 
period, for precautionary reasons - Market 
Equilibrium Benchmarks .
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Results
 4 sessions run on the 12th , 18th, 19th and 20th of  May 
2009 at Minho University – Braga, Portugal (after a pilot 
session on the 21st of  March 2009).
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 €22.15 average earnings on the 4 sessions (including a 
5€ participation fee).
Results
 Risk neutral or risk averse subjects did not 
bank one unit each period (0.65 units on 
average). 
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 Excessive banking in one of  the sessions 
resulted in excess supply at the first price of  the 
auction (therefore, more restrictive abatement 
target). 
Results
 Significant differences between our auction 
permits allocation and the Ausubel auction 
predictions (abatement costs statistically different 
from benchmarks)
 Secondary market efficiently reallocated 
emission permits (realized gains superior to 
potential ones). 
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Efficiency Index
Period
Session 5 Session 6 Session 7 Session 8 TOTAL TOT_ses5
Is5 Im5 Is6 Im6 Is7 Im7 Is8 Im8 Is Im Is Im
1 -8.74 -3.16 -0.89 1.14 -0.50 1.36 -3.35 -0.21 -3.37 -0.22 -1.58 0.76
2 -2.42 -2.42 1.24 1.24 0.78 0.78 1.02 1.02 0.16 0.16 1.02 1.02
3 -0.23 -0.23 0.56 0.56 0.99 0.99 1.31 1.31 0.66 0.66 0.95 0.95
4 1.19 1.19 1.10 1.10 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92
5 1.73 1.73 1.28 1.28 1.12 1.12 1.45 1.45 1.40 1.40 1.28 1.28
6 -1.87 -1.87 1.21 1.21 0.57 0.57 0.92 0.92 0.21 0.21 0.90 0.90
7 -0.72 -0.72 0.75 0.75 1.01 1.01 0.56 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.77 0.77
8 1.74 1.74 0.63 0.63 1.02 1.02 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.13 0.93 0.93
9 -0.91 -0.91 0.85 0.85 1.28 1.28 1.02 1.02 0.56 0.56 1.05 1.05
10 3.01 1.66 2.34 1.15 2.10 0.97 1.99 0.88 2.36 1.17 2.14 1.00
Average -0.72 -0.30 0.91 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.68 0.89 0.45 0.64 0.84 0.96
Conclusion
 The institution represented was efficient (excluding 
outlier – session 5) - the market worked.
 Excessive banking results in more restrictive 
environmental targets and higher abatement 
costs, when auctioning is the initial allocation rule 
(not possible in the grandfathering treatment).  
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 The Ausubel (2004) auction was not efficient when 
implemented in a more complex environment.
Thank you for your attention!
eduarda@estg.ipleiria.pt
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Results
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